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ABSTRACT: Making the length of a prison sentence conditional on an individual’s offense 
history is shown to be a powerful way of preventing crime. Under a law adopted in the 
Netherlands in 2001, prolific offenders could be sentenced to a prison term that was some 
ten  times  longer  than  usual.  We  exploit  quasi-experimental  variation  in  the  moment  of 
introduction and the frequency of application across 12 urban areas to identify the effect. 
We find the sentence enhancements to have dramatically reduced theft rates. The size of 
the crime-reducing effect is found to be subject to sharply diminishing returns. 
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1  Introduction 
In  Steven  Spielberg’s  movie  Minority  Report,  the  so-called  “Precrime”  police  unit 
apprehends individuals before they are able to commit a planned or accidental criminal act. 
The officers from the unit have access to special powers that allow them to look into the 
future. By incapacitating potential offenders they alter the course of events and effectively 
ban out crime in Washington DC, the area in which the movie is set.  
In everyday reality, law enforcement has devised similar ways of preventing crime. It is 
common practice to make prison sentences dependent on the  predicted future criminal 
activity of an offender. In the courtroom, the predictor of choice of future criminal behavior 
is an offender’s prior record. The assertion is that earlier criminal activity makes it more 
likely that a given individual will commit crime in the future. Clearly, law enforcement is too 
late when an individual has already committed a crime, but with the predictive power of the 
prior record in mind, enhanced prison sentences for repeat offenders could at least prevent 
further criminal activity for the duration of the sentence (Greenwood and Abrahamse 1982).  
Enhanced prison sentences for repeat offenders can be seen as a separating contract that 
helps law enforcement to incapacitate those that are most criminally inclined. Individuals 
reveal themselves to be of the high offense propensity-type by not being deterred by the 
punishment for first-time offenders.
1 Enhanced prison sentences for only small numbers of 
offenders could  lead to major crime  reductions as the distribution of criminal acts over 
                                                             
1 A policy of selective incapacitation should be distinguished from a policy that makes punishment 
dependent on the seriousness of the offense committed. If having committed a serious offense is a 
predictor of committing another offense and possibly also of how serious the future offense will be, 
then making the use and the duration of prison sentences dependent on the seriousness of the 
offense is another example of a separating contract (see Shavell 1987). 3 
 
individuals is highly skewed (Piquero, Farrington, and Blumstein 2007). As worked out by 
Cook (1986), the crime-reducing effect will depend on the behavioral  response of other 
offenders – who may not only respond to opportunities for crime that now go unexploited 
but  also  to  the  shift  of  criminal  justice  resources  towards  prolific  offenders  –  and  the 
behavioral response of potential victims – who could take fewer precautions to protect 
themselves against crime. Being highly selective in incapacitating offenders is essential for 
the welfare impact of the policy because of the high costs related to prison sentences and 
for  humane  reasons.  Higher  punishment  for  repeat  offenders  can  also  correct  under-
deterrence of the most criminally inclined without the need of raising punishment across the 
board,  which  may  be  prohibitively  costly  (see  Polinsky  and  Rubinfeld  1991  for  an 
information-based argument, and Polinsky and Shavell 1998 for a similar result based on a 
model with identical offenders). 
Enhancing prison sentences for repeat offenders with the explicit goal of preventing crime 
through incapacitation has quickly gained popularity among lawmakers across the world. In 
the US, so-called habitual offender laws have been in place in most states since the 1970s. 
Some states have been particularly active in applying these laws, including Texas, Florida 
since 1988, and most famously, California since 1994. In these statutes – in their recent 
incarnations commonly referred to as ‘three strikes’-laws – a second or third conviction for a 
serious  crime  could  lead  to  extremely  long  prison  sentences.  Policies  of  selective 
incapacitation have been adopted in many other countries as well, including the UK in 1997, 
Australia in 1997, the Netherlands in 2001, Hungary in 2009, and New Zealand in 2010. 
The fierce debate about the costs and benefits of California’s three strikes law (Zimring, 
Hawkins and Kamin 2001, Shepherd 2002, among others) suggests that it is anything but 4 
 
trivial whether a policy of selective incapacitation improves social welfare. First of all, the 
welfare impact of selective incapacitation depends on existing sentencing policies. If there 
are decreasing returns to the rate of incarceration, for which Liedka, Morrison Piehl and 
Useem (2006) and Johnson and Raphael (2007) provide evidence, then further sentence 
enhancements  may  provide  a  small  crime-reducing  effect  at  high  cost.
 2 As  incidence  of 
criminal activity has been found to be decreasing with age (Farrington 1986), enhancing 
already long prison sentences may incapacitate offenders who would have refrained from 
crime anyway for most of the extra time that they spend in prison. Second, the welfare 
impact of the sentence enhancements depends on the scale at which the policy of selective 
incapacitation is applied. Casting the net wide by incapacitating great numbers of repeat 
offenders  for  a  long  time  is  likely  to  also  affect  offenders  with  relatively  low  criminal 
inclinations, which will lower the crime-reducing effect at the margin and negatively affect 
the net social benefit of the policy (Greenwood et al. 1994). California’s law is particularly 
extreme on this last dimension. It is not very selective. One or two prior convictions for a 
wide range of crimes can trigger extreme prison terms of up to a 25-years or life for a third 
strike. Consequently, the law affected great numbers of offenders, and resulted in a further 
increase in the incarceration rate. Between 1994 and 2005, some 100,000 prolific offenders 
were sentenced under the law. By 2010 some 41,000 prisoners were serving time under the 
two or three strikes provisions of the law, equal to some 25 percent of the California prison 
population (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2010). 
                                                             
2 In other words, in some cases reducing punishment for first-time offenders rather than increasing 
punishment for repeat offenders can be regarded as a policy of selective incapacitation (Polinsky and 
Shavell 1998, 313). 5 
 
Empirical evidence on the incapacitation effect of habitual offender laws is virtually non-
existent. Most of the empirical work into selective incapacitation relates to California’s 1994 
three strikes law. So far no reliable estimates of the incapacitation effects of the law are 
available.
 3 Empirical studies tend to focus on the deterrent effect instead. Using data on 
arrest profiles of criminals who were released from prison in 1994, Helland and Tabarrok 
(2007) identify the deterrent effect by comparing re-arrest rates of individuals convicted for 
two versus one strikeable offense. The two groups are made comparable by selecting those 
individuals who were tried twice for a strikeable offense, with some of them convicted for a 
strikeable offense only once, perhaps due to a plea-bargain. They find that the law reduces 
felony  arrest  rates  among  individuals  with  two  strikes  by  20  percent.  Iyengar  (2008) 
compares re-arrest rates of offenders with a similar criminal record pre and post adoption of 
the law, but a different order of crime commission. Strikes only start counting after an initial 
strikeable  offense.
4 Iyengar  finds  that  the  law  reduced  re-offending  by  20  percent  for 
second-strike eligible offenders and by 28 percent for third-strike eligible offenders.
5 
                                                             
3 Marvell and Moody (2001), Kovandzic, Sloan, and Vieraitis (2004), Worrall (2004) and Chen (2008) 
try to capture some of the incapacitation effects of the three strikes law by including a post-passage 
linear time trend. As the number of offenders sentenced under the law may well follow a non-linear 
time trend, and no supporting evidence for the assumption of linear growth is provided, the 
estimated coefficient of this term is hard to interpret. 
4 For instance, since burglary is a strikeable offense and theft is not, a theft counts as a second strike 
after a burglary, whereas for someone who is convicted for a theft first, being convicted for a 
burglary after the theft will be a first strike. 
5 In contrast to the evidence for a deterrent effect of the law based on individual criminal records, 
the evidence based on a comparison of trends in aggregate crime rates is mixed. Marvell and Moody 
(2001), Kovandzic, Sloan, and Vieraitis (2004) and Chen (2008) identify the crime-reduction effect of 
three strikes laws using variation in aggregate crime trends across states or cities and a binary 
variable denoting the passage of the law in a state. Given the great variation in application of the 6 
 
In a rare study outside the California context, Kovandzic (2001) evaluates the Florida habitual 
offender law, using county-level variation in aggregate crime rates during 1980-1998. A 1988 
revision of the law made repeat offenders no longer eligible for early release. The Florida law 
has  some  similarities  with  the  California  three  strikes  law.
6 Kovandzic  finds  statistically 
significant but small negative effects of this incapacitation variable on a number of crimes: 
four additional months in prison prevent one crime. He finds no evidence for a deterrent 
effect of the law. Given the presence of simultaneity in the relation between application of 
the law and county crime rates, the results are likely to be biased towards zero.  
Given the paucity of evidence on the incapacitation effects of sentence enhancements for 
prolific  offenders,  and  the  limited  empirical  evidence  outside  the  California  context, 
experiences  with  a  policy  of  selective  incapacitation  elsewhere  should  be  particularly 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
policy across states, the results are found to be highly heterogeneous – and hard to interpret. Using 
county-level data for California, Shepherd (2002) improves upon the aforementioned studies by 
including an indicator of how aggressively the three strikes law has been applied locally. The 
probability of a three strikes sentence is defined as the number of individuals receiving three strikes 
sentences divided by the number of offenders imprisoned. Based on data for 1983-1996, she finds 
evidence for a strong deterrent effect of the law on strikeable offenses. In a follow-up study with 
similar county-level data for 1989-2000, Worrall (2004) reaches the opposite conclusion. As 
deterrence variables he uses the number of three strikes sentences divided by the number of arrest 
for index offenses, and the percentage of people held in custody. Worrall finds only a negative effect 
of the law on larceny (ibid., 290, Table 2), the only crime for which Shepherd (2002) finds a positive 
effect of the law (which she explains by displacement towards non-strikeable offenses, including 
larceny). 
6 Ten years after revision of the Florida habitual offender law, habitual offenders accounted for some 
21 percent of the total prison population (Kovandzic 2001, 183), which is not unlike the 25 percent 
share of three strikes offenders in the California prison population in 2010.  The sentence 
enhancements were also large (for instance, some 6.5 additional years for burglary and 11 additional 
years for robbery). 7 
 
informative. In this paper, we estimate the crime-reducing effect of a habitual offender law 
adopted in the Netherlands in 2001. Offenders with ten or more offenses on their criminal 
record faced sentence enhancements of some 1,000 percent. Between 2001 and 2007 1,400 
mostly non-violent offenders were sentenced under the law. By the end of  2007, these 
offenders made up 5 percent of the inmate population. To identify the incapacitation effect 
we relate the number of offenders serving time under the law to variation in the aggregate 
crime rate in the area where they were found to be criminally active. By relating the policy to 
aggregate crime rates rather than individual offender behavior, our analysis allows for the 
earlier mentioned effects of incapacitation of offenders on the behavior of other offenders 
and  potential  victims  (see  Miles  and  Ludwig  (2007)  for  a  further  discussion  of  why  the 
incapacitation effect is best studied by relating sentencing policies to aggregate crime rates). 
We  exploit  the  fact  that  adoption  of  the  law  happened  under  quasi-experimental 
circumstances. The moment of introduction was not left to localities to decide. The national 
government allowed ten cities to experiment with the policy first, with the selection based 
on the number of prolific offenders known to be active in an area rather than the local crime 
trend. Only after a number of years other cities were allowed to apply the law. The rate of 
application was not related to local crime trends either. Rather, it was greatly affected by 
implementation  problems, including initial  reluctance of judges to apply the  law. In the 
longer run, variation in the rate of application is strongly related to the number of prolific 
offenders active in an area. We argue that variation in application of the policy across urban 
areas can be seen as exogenous to local crime trends, allowing us to identify the causal 
effect of the law in a panel data model with area-fixed effects. Using monthly data for 12 
urban areas between 2001 and 2007 we find the sentence enhancements to have resulted in 
a dramatic drop in the rate of theft from car and rate of burglary. We find evidence for 8 
 
rapidly decreasing returns to scale in application of the policy. The greater the number of 
offenders serving long-term prison sentences under the law, the smaller the crime-reducing 
effect at the margin. At current levels of application, the benefits of the policy are estimated 
to exceed the costs. 
Even  though  it  is  often  difficult  to  empirically  distinguish  between  deterrence  and 
incapacitation in an analysis that relies on aggregate crime data (Miles and Ludwig 2007), we 
argue  that  our  results  are  related  to  incapacitation  and  not  deterrence. First  and  most 
importantly, it is hard to imagine a deterrent effect that varies on a monthly basis with the 
number of prolific offenders serving enhanced prison sentences, the policy variable in our 
analysis. Second, in this specific case a deterrent effect is likely to be largely absent. Judges 
were highly selective in applying the law. Only drug-using, older individuals who had many 
more than the minimal number of ten offenses on their record and were practically immune 
to  treatment  had  a  chance  of  being  sentenced  under  the  law.  This  particular  group  of 
individuals can be characterized as the most hopeless of all prolific offenders and is difficult 
to deter as they had little to no alternative options to a life of crime. They relied on theft for 
a living and to maintain their drug habit, many of them for an extended period of time, 
sometimes up to twenty years.  After two decades of largely failed attempts to address the 
crime  problem  created  by  this  group  of  offenders, long-term  incapacitation  rather  than 
deterrence was mentioned by policymakers as the primary rationale behind the introduction 
of the habitual offender law (Vollaard 2010). 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we add to the empirical evidence on the 
impact of selective incapacitation on crime, in particular the size of the incapacitation effect. 
The  existing  literature  tends  to  either  focus  on  the  incapacitation  effect  of  sentence 9 
 
enhancements for all offenders (Owens 2009) or, as discussed above, on the deterrent effect 
of sentence enhancements for repeat offenders. We collect detailed data on the application 
of the policy at the geographical level at which the prolific offenders are active, the urban 
area. In addition, we are explicit about the quasi-experimental nature of the variation that 
we use to identify the effect of the policy. As such, we provide the first evaluation of a 
habitual offender law adopted in a situation of incarceration rates that were much lower 
than in the US in the 1990s. In addition, the Dutch law was much more selective in nature 
than the California three strikes law, which we argued to be an important determinant of the 
welfare impact of a policy of selective incapacitation. Second, our paper provides unique 
evidence on decreasing returns to scale in sentence enhancements for repeat offenders. We 
were able to obtain the criminal records of all of the offenders convicted under the law. We 
show higher  rates of application  of the policy to go together with the  incapacitation of 
offenders  with  relatively  less  extensive  criminal  records.  Thus  far  the  literature  on 
diminishing returns to incarceration is based on estimating the crime-prison relationship at 
different rates of incarceration in the US (Liedka et al. 2006, Johnson and Raphael 2007). This 
type  of  indirect  evidence  allows  for  an  alternative  interpretation  of  the  findings.  The 
diminishing crime-reducing effect of incarceration could be due to the steep drop in criminal 
activity in the 1990s and 2000s in the US rather than the higher rate of incarceration. Our 
analysis focuses on a relatively homogeneous group of offenders over the course of a few 
years, which leaves the increased scale of the sentencing policy as the only explanation for 
diminishing returns. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  introduces  the  habitual 
offender law adopted in the Netherlands. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents 
the  identification  strategy  and  section  5  presents  our  parameter  estimates,  including  a 10 
 
variety of sensitivity tests. We conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the policy in section 6. 
Section 7 concludes. 
2  The habitual offender law 
The Dutch habitual offender law came into force in April 2001. Under the law, judges were 
given discretion to sentence offenders with ten or more offenses on their criminal record to 
a prison term of two years. As the months of pre-trial detention were not subtracted from 
the  sentence,  the  prison  term  usually  totaled  some  three  years.  Any  offense  excluding 
misdemeanors counted towards the prior record that was used to convict an offender under 
the law. Given prison sentences of a few weeks or months for the offenses that typically 
triggered application of the law such as burglary and theft from car, a prison term of 24 to 36 
months was a major sentence enhancement. 
Application of the law was anything but mechanic. A judge could only sentence an offender 
to an enhanced prison term if the prosecutor together with the probation council could 
provide evidence that other means of preventing future offending, such as drug treatment, 
had failed. The law was meant as an ultimum remedium. In 2001, nationwide some 3,000 to 
4,000 offenders could be classified as prolific under the law (on a total population of the 
Netherlands of 16 million). In practice, only a select number of these offenders had a chance 
of  being  convicted  under  the  habitual  offender  law.  Because  of  the  ultimum  remedium 
provision, judges almost exclusively sentenced drug-using, older individuals under the law 
for whom there was thought to be no hope of preventing high-rate offending by any other 
means than incapacitation.  
Most of the convicted offenders were not able to maintain a normal life style. They were out 
of work and did not have stable housing. They committed theft for a living, collecting a daily 11 
 
income of some 50 to 100 euro ($70-130) to be able to maintain their habit, which implies 
stealing property valuing some 300 to 600 euro ($400-800) on a daily basis. By 2001, many 
of these highly prolific offenders were aged 40 or over: they had fallen victim of the heroin-
epidemic that swept Europe back in the 1980s. The offenders spent some three to four 
months in  prison each year  in absence  of the  new law, and some had as many as 300 
offenses on their criminal record. On average, offenders had been convicted 31 times prior 
to being sentenced under the habitual offender law (Koeter and Bakker 2007, Table 3.7, 71) 
The enhanced prison sentence was not only meant to reduce crime through incapacitation 
but to provide a window for coercive treatment as well. Incarceration was often combined 
with  drug  treatment  and  other  rehabilitative  services,  such  as  social  skills  training. 
Evaluations of the law suggest the treatment programs had little effect on recidivism (Koeter 
and Bakker 2007), an issue we will return to in section 4. 
3  Data 
Data on the monthly inflow and outflow of offenders into and out of prison facilities for 
prolific  offenders  between  January  2001  and  December  2007  were  obtained  from  the 
Department  of  Corrections  (DJI).  The  prisoner-level  data  denotes  the  start  of  pre-trial 
detention rather than the start of the extended two-year sentence, which is helpful since 
that date denotes the start of the actual prison term. If the term starts after the 15th of the 
month, we assign the prisoner to the inflow of the next month. To obtain our policy variable 
that  denotes  the  extra  time  that  the  convicted  offenders  are  serving  compared  to  the 
sentences  they  would  have  received  in  absence  of  the  habitual  offender  law,  we  start 
counting as of the fifth month of detention. As discussed in section 2, the offenders spend 
on average some three to four months per year in prison in absence of the law. 12 
 
As shown in Figure  1, growth  in the number of offenders convicted under the habitual 
offender law happened in two waves. The first wave started when the law was introduced in 
ten cities in 2001. The second wave started at the end of 2004 when prison capacity was 
greatly extended to allow for country-wide application of the law and lasted until mid-2007. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
To determine in which urban area the offenders were criminally active, we obtained the 
criminal records for all offenders. The criminal record includes data on the locality in which 
each offense was committed. For the analysis, we used the universe of 31 major cities in the 
Netherlands (the so-called G31 cities) and 4 neighboring cities. Because of data limitations, 
we  had  to  exclude  four  cities  in  the  very  north  of  the  country  (Alkmaar,  Groningen, 
Leeuwarden, Emmen).  Based on the  offenses committed during 1998-2008 we matched 
every convicted offender to one of the remaining 31 cities. Of the 1,407 offenders that had 
been sentenced to an extended prison term during 2001-2007, 85 percent were criminally 
active in one of 31 cities. The other offenders were either active in other cities or their 
whereabouts were uncertain. The match shows that offenders tend to operate very locally. 
Their working area is mostly limited to one city, but may extend to neighboring cities at a 
distance  of  at  most  15  kilometers  (9  miles).  Directly  neighboring  cities  tend  to  have  a 
particularly dense network of public transport connections, allowing the offenders to extend 
their working area to another city while keeping the downtown area of the city where they 
live as a base. Because of the overflow to nearby cities, we grouped the 31 cities into 12 
urban areas consisting of 2 to 4 co-located cities.
7 The offense data show that 85 percent of 
                                                             
7 The 12 urban areas include: Amsterdam-Zaanstad-Haarlem, Rotterdam-Schiedam-Vlaardingen-
Dordrecht, Den Haag-Zoetermeer-Leiden, Utrecht-Amersfoort, Arnhem-Nijmegen, Breda-Tilburg-’s-13 
 
all offenses known to the police were committed within the urban area an offender has 
been  assigned  to.  The  other  15  percent  of  offenses  were  mostly  committed  in  smaller 
communities directly bordering the urban area. 
Monthly  data  on  reported  and  recorded  theft  at  the  city  level  were  provided  by  the 
Netherlands police. We selected police recorded theft from car and domestic burglary: these 
are offenses typically committed by the offenders defined as prolific under the law. Because 
of  low and varying  reporting rates, we excluded two other offenses popular with these 
prolific offenders: bicycle theft and shoplifting.
8 We were able to construct consistent time 
series for all urban areas for the period January 1999 to December 2007. Table 1 provides 
summary characteristics for the variables used in the analysis. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
4  Identification 
The aim of this paper is to identify the incapacitation effect of the habitual offender law.
9 
Ideally, to identify the effect, prolific offenders should only receive the enhanced prison 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Hertogenbosch, Eindhoven-Helmond, Enschede-Hengelo-Almelo, Maastricht-Heerlen-Sittard-Geleen, 
Lelystad-Almere, Venlo-Roermond, Deventer-Zwolle. 
8 Comparing police recorded crime and data from victimization surveys suggest that some 85 percent 
of bicycle theft and more than 90 percent of shoplifting goes unreported. 
9 We do not attempt to estimate the deterrent effect of the policy. As discussed in the introduction, 
deterrence effects are best studied with individual offender data, not with aggregate crime data. 
Kessler and Levitt (1999) propose to study the crime rate immediately following the passage of the 
law as a way of identifying the deterrence effect. In their reasoning, this short-term effect can only 
be attributed to deterrence as it will take longer before incapacitation starts affecting the crime rate. 
In our case, it is uncertain whether the deterrent effect is concentrated at the moment of 
introduction in an urban area or materializes when a greater number of prolific offenders is 
convicted under the law. Moreover, given the short prison terms in the Netherlands, the 14 
 
sentences in a group of randomly selected urban areas, keeping the other urban areas as 
controls (assuming that the offenders remain in the same area, an issue we return to later in 
this  section).  In  addition,  the  urban  areas  in  the  treatment  group should  work  towards 
incapacitating a randomly selected target level of prolific offenders. Under these conditions, 
both the moment of introduction of the law and the rate of application of the law in an 
urban area would be independent from the local crime trend. The causal effect of the law 
could then be identified by comparing the change in the crime rate of the urban areas with 
the policy to those without the policy – while taking into account variation between urban 
areas in the number of offenders that were convicted under the law. 
Although no such experiment was conducted, implementation of the law happened under 
circumstances that closely resemble this experiment. First of all, the moment of introduction 
of the policy in an urban area was not left to the local authorities to decide. Rather, to 
experiment with the new policy, the national government restricted application of the law to 
ten cities initially. As a result of a conflict about funding, one of these ten selected cities, The 
Hague, only introduced the measure in 2004. After the initial period of 3.5 years, all other 
cities were allowed to try offenders under the habitual offender law, something they all 
started to work on almost immediately. Figure 2 shows that the date at which the first 
prolific offender was sentenced under the law in an urban area is strongly related to the 
decisions that were made at the national level. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
incapacitation effect may be felt in the crime rate shortly after introduction of the policy. Shepherd 
(2002) identifies a deterrent effect of the California three strikes law using data on the probability of 
apprehension. We do not have monthly data on the population of offenders that can be qualified as 
prolific under the criteria of the law, however. Without a proper way of identifying the deterrent 
effect, we abstract from it in the analysis. 15 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Selection of the initial group of cities was based on the number of prolific offenders known 
to the police, rather than the local crime trend. In other words, we should not see an upward 
crime trend prior to the moment of introduction. Figure 3 shows the crime trends up to the 
moment of introduction for the three groups of urban areas distinguished in Figure 2. As 
discussed in Section 3, we look at crimes typically committed by offenders sentenced under 
the habitual offender law: theft from car and domestic burglary. As expected, the crime 
trends shown in Figure 3 show no relation with the moment of introduction of the law. 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The rate of application of the habitual offender law in an urban area was also based on the 
number of prolific offenders in the area, rather than the local crime trend. During the first 
wave, the national government used the number of prolific offenders in an area in 2000 to 
allocate prison capacity across the urban areas. The cities steadily worked towards filling the 
allotted capacity. The number of prolific offenders convicted under the law in an urban area 
at  the  end  of  the  first  wave  was  strongly  correlated  with  the  allotted  prison  capacity 
(pairwise correlation coefficient of 0.85). Shortly into the second wave, when it appeared 
that capacity was abundant, all capacity constraints were lifted. Still, the number of prolific 
offenders  convicted  under  the  law  at  the  end  of  the  second  wave  remained  strongly 
correlated with the number of prolific offenders known to the police at the beginning of the 
second wave (pairwise correlation coefficient of 0.85). Figures 4 and 5 show how the urban 
areas steadily worked towards incapacitating a target number of prolific offenders, after 
which growth in application of the law leveled off. 16 
 
Short-term adjustments to the target level of offenders to be long-term incapacitated were 
practically  infeasible  –  which  also  explains  the  gradual  growth  in  application  shown  in 
Figures 4 and 5. Introduction of the law was plagued with many implementation problems 
that  took  several  years  to  resolve.  Getting  prolific  offenders  through  the  system  took 
considerable effort, including intensive coordination between the multiple agencies involved 
in identifying, arresting, and making a case against a prolific offender. These efforts were 
often frustrated by unwilling judges. Initially, many judges were highly reluctant to apply the 
long-term  prison  sentences,  and  did  not  follow  the  sentence  demanded  by  the  public 
prosecutor in many cases.
10 Only after some positive experiences with what the long-term 
prison  sentences  meant  for  the  mental  and  physical  health  of  the  targeted  offenders 
(through observing a regular day and night rhythm, eating proper food for a number of 
months, conversations with case workers, treatment) judges became more willing to convict 
offenders under the habitual offender law (Vollaard 2010). Witnessing the gradual growth in 
Figures 4 and 5, progress was slow. Clearly, it was not the local crime trend that was driving 
decisions of judges, but feedback from incarcerated offenders. 
[FIGURES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Since both the moment of introduction and the rate of application in an urban area can be 
argued to be independent from local crime trends during 2001-2007, variation in application 
of the law across the twelve urban areas can be seen as a natural experiment. The causal 
effect of the policy can then be identified by comparing changes in crime rates across urban 
areas. The key prediction is that more intensive use of the policy goes together with a more 
                                                             
10 Evidence from several cities suggests that initially judges sentenced repeat offenders to the 
enhanced prison terms in 1 in 3 or 1 in 4 cases that the sentence was demanded (Vollaard 2010). 17 
 
favorable  trend  in  the  local  crime  rate.    At  the  end  of  this  section,  we  discuss  three 
additional  assumptions  underlying  a  causal  interpretation  of  the  results,  including 
independence from other policies, the local nature of the criminal activities of the offenders, 
and a negligible effect of treatment on recidivism rates. 
As  a  first  step  towards  identifying  the  effect,  we  graphically  examine  how  crime  rates 
changed after introduction of the policy. We specify an event time model that allows us to 
non-parametrically estimate the average trend in crime rates before and after the moment 
of  introduction.  As  all  urban  areas  gradually  increased  the  number  of  long-term 
incapacitated prolific offenders, introduction of the policy can be seen as a discrete event. 
We estimate the following equation: 
Cj,t = ∑ 
     ατ Wτ + Xj,t β + γj + Φy + δq +  εj,t     (1) 
The dependent variable is the rate of recorded theft per 10,000 population in urban area j in 
month  t.  The  event  time  indicator  variables  Wτ  track  the  month  when  the  policy  is 
introduced  in  an  area  and  the  months  preceding  and  following  the  introduction.  The 
indicator variable W0 equals 1 for the month that the policy is introduced in one of the areas 
and is zero otherwise; W1 equals 1 for the first month after the introduction and is zero 
otherwise,  and  so  on.  Because  our  data  cover  an  8-year  period  and  most  urban  areas 
introduced the policy within 3 years from January 1999, τ is capped at 3 years before and 
after the moment of introduction. We bin the event time indicators at both tails of the 3-
year period. To compare changes in the crime rate over time rather than differences in crime 
levels between urban areas, we include urban area fixed effects γj. The area fixed effects 
prevent estimation bias from unobserved factors that remained approximately stable over 
the study period and that caused crime rates to differ across urban areas. Think of the locally 18 
 
available capacity for voluntary treatment of addiction to drugs, for instance. X is a vector of 
time-varying characteristics of urban areas, including the quarterly rate of unemployment 
and, to control for  broader changes in crime policy, the monthly number of arrests per 
10,000 population. Other area characteristics such as age structure and ethnic composition 
of the population were not included as they are only available at an annual frequency and 
show little to no variation within the 8-year period covered in the analysis. In the sensitivity 
analysis, we show our results to be robust to including area-specific linear time trends. The 
year fixed effects Φy control for events that could raise or lower crime rates in a given year 
across the twelve urban areas. To prevent estimation bias from seasonal effects, we also 
include quarter fixed effects δq. 
Figure 6 plots the event time indicator coefficients ατ from equation (1). Event time is plotted 
on the horizontal axis. Event time zero corresponds to the month the policy is introduced in 
an urban area. The plotted event time coefficients denote the average crime rate in month τ 
relative to the crime rate at the moment of introduction – while controlling for urban area, 
year  and  quarter  fixed  effects,  the  rate  of  unemployment  and  the  arrest  rate.  Figure  6 
suggests that introduction of the policy resulted in a drop in the crime rate. We do not see a 
discrete drop in the crime rate around the moment of introduction, which is to be expected 
since the policy had a very slow and gradual start. The incapacitation effect of the law was 
slow in coming, which explains the rather gradual change in the crime trend shown in Figure 
6. Three years after the introduction, the average crime rate was reduced by some 5 thefts 
per 10,000 population. Given an average rate of theft of some 25 per 10,000 population 
during 1999-2000, the event time analysis suggests that the policy had a major impact on 
the crime trend. 19 
 
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
To identify the effect on the crime rate of convicting one additional prolific offender under 
the habitual offender law, we need to be more specific about the rate at which the law was 
applied once it was introduced. In addition, we have to specify the nature of the relationship 
between a change in the number of offenders incapacitated per capita and the crime rate. 
We estimate the following equation: 
Cj,t = α PRISONj,t + Xj,t β + γj + Φy + δq +  εj,t     (2) 
Policy variable PRISON denotes the number of prolific offenders per 10,000 population from 
area j incapacitated under the law in month t. As noted in Section 3, we start counting as of 
the fifth month of detention to approximate the extra time that offenders are serving in 
prison.
11 Our parameter of interest is α, which denotes the change in crime resulting from 
one additional offender serving a long-term sentence (both per 10,000 population). Equation 
(2) assumes a linear relationship between the policy variable and the crime rate. As we will 
see in the next section, we find strong evidence for decreasing returns to scale once we 
allow for a non-linear relationship. 
A causal interpretation of the parameter of interest in equation (2) relies on three additional 
assumptions. First of all, implementation of the habitual offender law in the 12 urban areas 
should not be related to any other policy that may have affected crime. The effect estimated 
with equation (2) is relative to the existing policies in dealing with prolific offenders, such as 
government provision of heroin and methadone to registered drug users, a common practice 
                                                             
11 Allowing for a greater than 5 months-lag does not affect the results. Shortening the time window 
reduces the size of the effect, what is to be expected since the incapacitation effect of the law is 
driven by enhanced prison terms. 20 
 
in the Netherlands. If stable over time, differences in alternative policies across urban areas 
could  lead  to  some  heterogeneity  in  the  results  but  should  not  bias  estimation  of  the 
incapacitation effect.
12 During 2001-2007 no other major policy initiatives targeted at the 
specific group of prolific offenders affected by the habitual offender law were launched. In 
other words, the extended prison terms substitute any alternative short-term punishment 
and  treatment  that  offenders  may  have  received  in  absence  of  the  law.  In  a  broader 
campaign against crime, other criminal justice policies were intensified during 2002-2005. 
The policies were mainly aimed at tougher policing of delinquent youth and forwarding a 
greater number of criminal cases from the police to the public prosecution council (Vollaard 
2010).  These  initiatives  are  partly  reflected  in  the  arrest  rate,  included  as  covariate  in 
equation (2), which shows a rise and fall during 2002-2005. In the sensitivity analysis, we 
show our results not to be affected by other policies during the first wave of application of 
the habitual offender law: the estimated incapacitation effects pre and post 2005 are similar. 
Second, we assume the targeted offenders to remain in the same urban area. Evading arrest 
by moving to another area that is also included in our analysis may lead us to overestimate 
the incapacitation effect. The offenders affected by the law were hampered in their ability to 
move elsewhere because of their reliance on local networks of drug dealers and middlemen 
that buy stolen goods. Anecdotal evidence from police officers suggests that the prolific 
offenders tend to be well-known to local law enforcement. Police officers know perfectly 
well how the offenders make a living. Regular arrests do not make the offenders to move 
away: the gate of the local prison is a ‘revolving door’. The introduction of the habitual 
offender law was very gradual and did not change these local dynamics (Vollaard 2010).  In 
                                                             
12 We cannot explicitly model other policies of dealing with prolific offenders because data on these 
policies are not systematically collected at the city-level. 21 
 
line with the anecdotal evidence, in the next section, we show that the number of prolific 
offenders active in a locality goes down proportionally with an increase in the number of 
prolific  offenders  from  that  same  locality  that  is  serving  an  enhanced  prison  sentence. 
Moreover, in the sensitivity analysis, we show the size of the effect to be similar pre and 
post  2005,  whereas  opportunities  to  evade  a  long-term  prison  sentence  by  moving  to 
another area only existed up to the end of 2004. This finding also suggests that offenders 
remained active in the same urban area. 
A final assumption underlying our method of identification is that treatment during the 
enhanced prison sentence had no or a small effect on the rate of offending after release. 
This assumption is not unrealistic given the available evidence (Mitchell et al. 2006). In the 
presence of a strong treatment effect an inflow of prolific offenders has a larger effect in 
absolute terms on the local crime rate than an outflow. In terms of equation (2): the effect 
on the crime rate from a net monthly increase in the number of offenders sentenced under 
the law will then be higher than the effect  of  a net monthly  decrease. Parameter  α  in 
equation (2) can be interpreted as the average effect of net increases and net decreases in 
the number of prolific offenders incapacitated. If treatment has an effect on recidivism rates, 
then our estimate of the incapacitation effect will be biased towards zero. In the sensitivity 
analysis we conduct a test of whether the effect on the local crime rate from net increases is 
different from net decreases in the policy variable. We find similar effects of net increases 
and net decreases, suggesting that our assumption of a negligible treatment effect is valid. 
5  Estimation results 
Table 2 presents the estimation results based on equation (2). The parameter estimate for 
the  number  of  prolific  offenders  incapacitated  under  the  habitual  offender  law  has  the 22 
 
expected negative sign. Under the assumption of a linear relationship between the policy 
and outcome variable we are not able to precisely estimate an average marginal effect, 
however. As discussed previously, incapacitating greater numbers of prolific offenders for an 
extended time is likely to reduce the crime-reducing effect at the margin. To allow for a non-
linear relationship between the policy variable and the crime rate, we estimate the average 
marginal effect at four regular intervals in the second column. In the sensitivity analysis we 
show that the results are similar when we estimate the average effect at seven rather than 
four intervals. We find strong evidence for diminishing returns. The incapacitation effect is 
lower at higher rates of application of the policy, which is what we expect. The effect can 
now  be  more  precisely  estimated.  The  difference  between  the  high-end  and  low-end 
estimates is statistically significant. 
Given an average number of prolific offenders that are serving long-term prison sentences of 
0.55 per 10,000 population, the estimation results suggest that incapacitating one additional 
prolific offender results on average in some 9 fewer recorded thefts per month, which is 
equal to more than 100 recorded thefts per year. With a total number of recorded thefts of 
176,000 per year in 2001, the 1,200 prolific offenders that were at some point serving time 
under the law in one of the 12 urban areas during 2001-2007 account for some 70 percent of 
these two types of theft, which is similar to what Machin and Marie (2009) find based on 
self-reported crime data. Clearly, this finding reinforces the basic tenet underlying a policy of 
selective incapacitation that only a few offenders are responsible for a large proportion of all 
crime. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 23 
 
We provide separate estimates for theft from car and domestic burglary in the last two 
columns of table 1. The effect on theft from car is statistically significant at all rates of 
application of the policy; the effect on burglary is statistically significant for the high-end and 
low-end estimates. It is striking how different the estimates are: the effect on theft from car 
is  much  larger  than  the  effect  on  burglary.  The  difference  is  statistically  significant.  A 
possible explanation for this difference is the high return to burglary relative to theft from 
car. The typical prolific offender needs to collect a daily income from theft. The value of 
stolen goods is a factor of three to four times higher for burglary than for theft from car 
(Home Office 2005). In other words, to achieve the income target, the offender needs to 
commit fewer burglaries than thefts from car. 
To illustrate the size of the estimated incapacitation effect, Figure 7 plots the simulated 
trend of the rate of theft in absence of the law. The dotted line shows what the theft rate 
would have been if the policy had not been adopted. We take into account the diminishing 
returns reported in Table 2. The simulation suggests that crime went down during 2002-
2005 also for other reasons than the habitual offender law, probably as a result of other 
policy initiatives that were discussed in the previous section. The crime drop during 2002-
2005 can be observed in most urban areas and is captured in the year-fixed effects that are 
included in the estimation equation. Figure 7 shows that the incapacitation effect of the law 
grows as long as greater numbers of offenders are sentenced to the enhanced prison terms, 
which is until shortly before the end of 2007. By that time, the rate of theft is some 30 to 40 
percent lower as a result of selective incapacitation of prolific offenders. The size of the drop 
in crime corresponds with the results of some back-of-the-envelope calculations. If 1,200 
offenders are responsible for 70 percent of crime, as we argued above, then the close to 700 
offenders serving time under the law by mid-2007 are responsible for 40 percent of crime. 24 
 
That percentage may actually be somewhat higher, as crime has been coming down for 
other reasons during 2001-2007. The crime-reducing effect of the law is smaller than this 
percentage share, however, since some of the offenders would have been doing time also in 
absence of the law. Assuming 8 additional months of incarceration per year as a result of the 
law, the drop in crime can be put at some 30 percent, which is close to what we find in the 
simulation.  
[FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
Supporting evidence for the estimated incapacitation effect 
Our findings are roughly in  line with what is known about the criminal activities of this 
particular group of offenders. An average estimated effect of some 100 recorded thefts per 
year implies some 120 incidents of theft since not all theft is reported and recorded. In a 
self-report study,  offenders sentenced under the habitual offender law admitted to  256 
cases of theft per year on average (Koeter and Bakker 2007, 71, Table 3.7). The authors note 
that the self-reported number of thefts is likely to be an underestimate of the actual number 
of thefts. Our results suggest that theft from car and burglary account for about half of the 
self-reported total. Shoplifting and bicycle theft, the two other property offenses popular 
with these prolific offenders, can easily account for the other half. If the average haul of 
theft is what drives offending patterns, then the number of thefts from shops and bicycle 
thefts prevented through incapacitation is likely to be at least as high as the number of 
thefts from car and burglaries. 
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Supporting evidence for a reduction in the number of active prolific offenders 
The police provided us with annual data on the number of prolific offenders aged 25 or over 
that were active in each of the urban areas during 1996-2007. The definition of a prolific 
offender used in the police data is similar to the definition used in the habitual offender law 
(ten or more offenses committed over the last five years, of which one in the current year). 
The data on the offender population allow us to verify the estimation results reported in 
Table 2. If the policy was effective in lowering crime by way of the incapacitation effect, then 
we should see lower numbers of active prolific offenders when higher numbers of offenders 
are serving long-term prison sentences. We estimate the following equation: 
PROLIFICj,t = α PRISONj,t + γj + Φy + λl +  εj,t     (3) 
Dependent variable PROLIFIC is the number  of  prolific offenders known to the police  in 
urban area j and year t. Again, PRISON is the number of offenders serving a long-term prison 
sentence  after  being  convicted  under  the  habitual  offender  law.  We  include  area  fixed 
effects γj and year fixed effects Φy. The data covers a period of five years before the law was 
implemented in the first group of cities, which allows us to also include a linear time trend λl 
for  each  of  the  urban  areas.  In  line  with  our  prior  identification  strategy,  we  assume 
application of the law to be exogenous to the trend in the number of prolific offenders in an 
area. We expect α to be around 1: one additional incapacitated offender results in one less 
prolific offender out on the streets. We do not expect the coefficient to be much greater 
than 1. That would be the case if prolific offenders move out of the area in response to 
introduction of the law or if offenders manage to avoid arrest, for instance by reducing their 
rate of offending. As discussed previously, offenders tend to remain in the same area and to 
continue offending because of a lack of alternatives. We also do not expect the effect to be 26 
 
much  smaller  than  1.  For  instance,  such  would  be  the  case  if  long-term  incapacitated 
offenders were replaced by other offenders that are attracted by opportunities for theft that 
now go unexploited (Cook 1986). Alternatively, attention of the police may be focused on 
the well-known local drug addicts, leaving room for other offenders to become more active. 
The offending of this particular group of addicted offenders seems to be largely driven by a 
need to make an income rather than chance opportunities, creating a demand for stolen 
goods that may vanish as soon these offenders are incapacitated. 
Table 3 reports the estimation results  based on equation (3). As expected, we  find the 
estimated effect to be close to one. In the second column, we account for a one-year lag in 
the police data on active offenders. The annual counts of prolific offenders active in the area 
include those that were incapacitated at some point during the year. As a result, it may take 
another year before incapacitated prolific offenders drop out of the active population. If we 
include the policy variable and its one-year lagged equivalent in equation (3) we find the 
total effect to be more  or  less equally spread  over the current and following year. The 
analysis of changes in the population of prolific offenders known to the police confirms that 
the effect  on  crime works through incapacitation. These  results imply that it  is valid to 
interpret  the  parameter  estimates  in  Table  2  as  the  number  of  crimes  prevented  per 
offender. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Supporting evidence for the presence of decreasing returns to scale 
The criminal records of the offenders that were sentenced under the habitual offender law 
allow for a verification test of the presence of decreasing returns to scale. If diminishing 
returns are present, then we should see offenders with the most extensive criminal records 27 
 
to be incapacitated first and offenders with somewhat less extensive criminal records to be 
incapacitated later. For each offender, we select the offenses on the criminal record that 
were committed in the four years prior to conviction under the habitual offender law.
13 
Figure 8 shows the relationship between the rate of at which the policy is applied and the 
mean number of offenses on the criminal record of offenders that were incapacitated at that 
rate of application. The police data confirm our findings. At higher levels of application of the 
policy, the mean number of offenses on the criminal record of offenders tends to be lower. 
Of  all  12  areas,  the  Rotterdam-region  is  the  only  exception.  We  do  not  know  why  the 
selection process of prolific offenders was different in this area. Overall, the mean number 
of offenses drops by about a third when comparing the highest and the  lowest rate of 
application of the policy. The difference is large, albeit smaller than the difference in the 
estimated marginal effects reported in Table 2. 
[FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
Sensitivity analysis 
As a test of the robustness of our findings, we re-estimate our model using a number of 
alternative specifications. Our identifying assumption is that the application of the policy is 
unrelated to local crime trends. In our baseline model, we include covariates to prevent 
estimation bias stemming from a systematic relation between police activity and economic 
conditions and application of the policy. As a further test, we include linear time trends for 
each of the urban areas. These trends prevent bias from any relationship between growth in 
application of the policy and trends in an area. The results are presented in the second 
column  of Table 4. The parameter estimates hardly change when including area-specific 
                                                             
13 The results are similar when selecting a shorter or longer time-window. 28 
 
linear time trends, providing further support  for our assumption that application of the 
policy is exogenous to local crime trends. 
To  allow  for  a  non-linear  impact  of  the  law  on  the  crime  rate,  we  estimated  the 
incapacitation effect at four regular intervals in Table 2. The number of intervals may be too 
small to reliably estimate the relationship, resulting in biased parameter estimates. In the 
third column of Table 4, we extend the number of intervals to seven. We find the results to 
be  highly  similar  to  the  baseline  estimates.  Thus  our  results  are  robust  to  a  smoother 
approximation of the non-linear relation between the policy and the crime rate. 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
As discussed in section 3, implementation of the habitual offender law happened in two 
phases, with a first wave related to the introduction of the policy in ten cities and a second 
wave when application of the policy was widened to all cities at the end of 2004. Capacity 
constraints were lifted in the second wave, although the rate of application remained closely 
related to the number of prolific offenders known to the local police, the variable that was 
used to allocate prison capacity in the first wave. To test how robust our results are to the 
two different phases of implementation of the policy, we allow the effect of the law on the 
crime rate to differ before and after 2005. We cannot identify an effect of high rates of 
application  of  the  policy  before  2005,  as  application  rates  had  not  achieved  high  levels 
before 2005 yet. The results in the fourth column of Table 4 show that the results are similar. 
The small differences in the parameter estimates are not statistically significantly different 
from zero. 
As discussed in section 4, abstracting from the effect of incarceration-based treatment on 
crime rates through reduced rates of recidivism could bias our estimate of the incapacitation 29 
 
effect. We estimate the relation between the net inflow of offenders in a month and the 
monthly change in the local crime rate. Implicitly, we assume the effect of inflow on the local 
crime rate to be similar to the effect of outflow. If this assumption does not hold, then the 
estimated incapacitation effect is biased towards zero. To test whether a bias exists, we 
separately model increases and decreases in the net inflow of prolific offenders sentenced 
under the new law (cf. Mocan and Bali 2010). In case of an increase, the inflow dominates 
our policy variable. Similarly, in case of a decrease, the outflow dominates. If the effect of 
outflow strongly deviates from the effect of inflow, then this should show in the estimated 
effects for increases and decreases in the policy variable. We alter the estimation equation 
as follows: 
  Cj,t = α1 PRISON+j,t + α2 PRISON–j,t + X j,t β + γj + Φy + δq + εj,t   (4) 
PRISON+ takes on the values of the previously defined policy variable PRISON in case of an 
increase relative to the previous month; PRISON– takes on the values in case of a decrease. 
The results in the last column of table 4 show that the two estimates are similar, suggesting 
the absence of a bias through a change in recidivism rates. This finding suggests that a 
rehabilitation effect, if present, is small. Clearly, a precise test of the size of the treatment 
effect should be based on individual level data on offenders rather than aggregate crime 
rates. Based on our analysis, we can only conclude that the treatment effect is sufficiently 
small not to bias estimation of the incapacitation effect. 
6  Costs and benefits of selective incapacitation 
Identifying the effects of the habitual offender law relative to alternative policies in dealing 
with prolific offenders as in equation (2) is important for an analysis of costs and benefits. 30 
 
For a meaningful analysis of the welfare impact of selective incapacitation, the policy should 
be compared to a practical alternative. 
The costs of incapacitating and providing treatment to prolific offenders amount to some 
200 euro per day or 73,000 euro per year. In absence of the new law, on average, prolific 
offenders spend some four months per year in prison at a slightly lower cost of 180 euro per 
day. Taking the difference between the two, we find the additional costs of the policy to be 
equal to 51,400 euro per year per prolific offender. 
In addition to these costs, the costs of use of the criminal justice system may have changed 
as well. On the one hand, offenders are sentenced once for a period of two to three years, 
rather than going in and out of prison a couple of times per year, saving resources within the 
criminal  justice  system.  On  the  other  hand,  substantial  costs  are  related  to  identifying, 
arresting and convicting prolific offenders under the new law. In the absence of detailed 
information on the use of resources of the  police, the public  prosecutor, the probation 
service and the courts, we have to leave these costs outside the analysis. 
Based on the results in Table 2, correcting for non-reporting and non-recording of crime, and 
under the assumption that the affected offenders spend 8 additional months in prison per 
year, the law prevents some 80 thefts from car and 9 domestic burglaries annually per long-
term incapacitated offender. That implies that the costs per crime prevented are equal to 
some 600 euros. In other words, if the social costs of a domestic burglary and a theft from 
car are higher than 600 euros, then the policy is welfare improving. 
Estimates of the costs of crime are surrounded by controversy. Ex post approaches estimate 
the cost of crime that has already occurred to identifiable victims. Based on jury awards, 
Roman  (2009)  estimates  the  average  costs  of  a  burglary  to  be  $4,444  (3,300  euro). 31 
 
Accounting for all of the costs that are known to be related to crime, including damage and 
the costs of use of the criminal justice system, the Home Office produces a somewhat higher 
estimate of the costs of a burglary of 4,600 euro ($6,000) per incident. A separate estimate 
for the cost of a theft from car is only available from the Home Office study, which puts it at 
1,200 euro ($1,600) per incident. Ludwig (2010) argues that an ex ante rather than the ex 
post perspective is more appropriate as it corresponds to the actual resource allocation 
problem  facing  policy  makers.  Compared  to  the  ex  post  estimates,  studies  based  on 
willingness-to-pay produce much larger cost estimates. Cohen et al. (2004) put the average 
costs of a burglary at $27,901 or 21,000 euro.
14 In any case, the costs of crime incidents are 
much higher than 600 euros, the average costs per crime prevented. When we take the two 
estimates from the Home Office (2005), the prevented crimes can be valued at 140,000 euro 
in total. At the average rate of application, the benefits exceed the costs by more than a 
factor of two. Cost of crime estimates based on willingness to pay would result in even more 
favorable cost-benefit ratios. 
[FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
We found the marginal effect of incapacitating offenders to decrease with more intensive 
application of the policy. Taking the Home Office (2005) cost of crime estimates, Figure 9 
shows how the annual benefits vary with the rate of application of the policy and how the 
benefits relate to the costs. The estimated effects at different intervals are smoothed to 
generate a gentle downward sloping benefit-curve. The figure suggests that at the highest 
                                                             
14 Given the anomalies in preventative behavior observed in other areas than crime, with some 
people not taking health precautions or building up pension savings even though they seem to know 
they would be better off if they did, it is a question for further research whether the high ex ante 
estimates based on stated preferences provide a realistic picture of the costs of crime. 32 
 
rate of application, which was achieved in 2007 in the  urban areas around Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam and The Hague, the benefits of the policy become equal to the costs. Clearly, the 
actual benefits are much higher if we would also take into account other offenses that these 
prolific  offenders  would  have  committed  during  incarceration,  including  shoplifting  and 
bicycle theft (as discussed previously, the deterrent effect of the law on the crime rate over 
and above the incapacitation effect is likely to be small). As we underestimate the benefits in 
Figure 9, we conclude that the social returns to selective incarceration seem to be positive 
over the whole range of application of the policy during 2001-2007. 
The costs and benefits of the policy for society should be weighed against the consequences 
for the individual offender. As noted before, most of the offenders involved are addicted to 
hard drugs, out of work and do not have stable housing. The two to three-year window for 
incarceration-based  treatment  is  meant  to  lower  their  drug  dependence  and  provide 
training.  Process  evaluations  of  the  policy  show  that  many  offenders see  the  long-term 
prison sentence as an opportunity to break with a life dominated by drug use rather than as 
a severe punishment (Koeter and Bakker 2007). Surveys among offenders show that some 
60 percent feel substantially better after the two to three year prison sentence. Only a small 
group considers the sentence as unfair and denies all treatment. These findings suggest that 
the crime prevention benefits may actually go together with an improvement of the lives of 
the majority of the prolific offenders. Thus the welfare impact of the policy may actually be 
more favorable rather than less favorable when taking into account the consequences for 
the offenders affected by the habitual offender law. 
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7  Conclusions 
We find that in a situation of a relatively low rate of incarceration sentence enhancements 
for a carefully selected group of prolific offenders can dramatically reduce the crime rate. A 
habitual offender law adopted in the Netherlands in 2001 allowed for a two to three year 
prison sentence for offenders with ten or more offenses on their criminal record. Although 
the group of offenders sentenced under the law accounted for only 5 percent of the prison 
population six years after its introduction, the sentencing policy lowered the rate of burglary 
and theft from car by an estimated 40 percent through the incapacitation effect alone. The 
estimated impact of the law is large, but in line with self-reported crime. In addition, police 
counts of active prolific offenders are found to go down proportionally with the number of 
prolific offenders serving extra time in prison as a result of the law.  
When comparing the cost of enhanced prison sentences with the social benefits of lower 
crime rates, we find the benefits of the policy  to exceed the costs. Even for this highly 
selective sentencing policy that only affected 1,400 offenders in the period 2001-2007 we 
find evidence for rapidly decreasing returns to scale. The marginal crime-reducing effect of 
incapacitating another prolific offender declines by more than half from the lowest to the 
highest  rate  of  application  of  the  law.  The  benefit-cost  ratio  drops  sharply  when  more 
offenders are serving time under the habitual offender law. The social returns to selective 
incarceration remain positive over the whole range of application of the policy, however. 
The finding of a non-linear impact of the policy on the crime rate contributes to the small 
literature on diminishing returns in the use of incarceration as form of punishment. 
The incapacitation effect may be particularly large in the case of the Netherlands as the 
habitual offender law primarily affected offenders that were addicted to drugs, heroin in 34 
 
particular. These offenders tend to have an age-crime curve that is flatter than that of other 
groups of offenders – even other prolific offenders. Possible negative effects of longer prison 
sentences  on  the  life  of  offenders  such  as  disruption  of  employment,  relationships  and 
housing were limited as most of the affected offenders were out of work and did not have 
stable housing. 
The  Dutch  policy  of  selective  incapacitation  started  from  a  low  base.  The  rate  of 
incarceration in the Netherlands around 2001 was similar to the rate in the beginning of the 
1970s in the US, for instance. Enhancing prison sentences of a few weeks or months to three 
years is likely to have a greater payoff in terms of preventing crime than enhancing prison 
sentences that are already many years long. To compare: an enhanced prison sentence for 
burglary of 2 to 3 years based on the Dutch habitual offender law is comparable to the 
default sentence for burglary in the United States (Lochner 2010, Table 1). Our finding that 
the  habitual  offender  law  adopted  in  the  Netherlands  had  a  large  incapacitation  effect 
should therefore not be interpreted as evidence that all policies of selective incapacitation 
are  likely  to  have  a  similarly  favorable  cost-benefit  ratio.  Given  the  rapidly  diminishing 
returns to incarceration, the high costs of the enhanced prison sentences may soon exceed 
the benefits of crime prevented. How much of an incapacitation effect other policies of 
selective incapacitation had is a question that begs further empirical study. 
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Table 1  Summary statistics, 12 urban areas, January 1999 – December 2007 
  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Min  Max 
Domestic burglary  5.90  1.88  1.46  13.73 
Theft from car  15.87  9.06  2.37  67.73 
Domestic burglary and theft from car  21.76  10.28  5.36  76.81 
Number of prolific offenders serving 









Number of arrests  0.55  0.16  0.14  1.07 
Rate of unemployment (%)  2.82  0.81  1.33  5.17 
         
Number of observations  1,296       
 
Notes. All variables are per 10,000 population, unless otherwise noted. Crime statistics are police recorded 
crime incidents. 
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Table 2  Estimated  incapacitation  effect  of  habitual  offender  law  on  rate  of  recorded  theft  per 
month, 12 urban areas, January 1999 – December 2007 
Dependent variable:  Theft from car 
and burglary 
Theft from car 
and burglary 
Theft from car  Burglary 
 
         
Number of incapacitated offenders  -4.58 (2.31)*       
         
Number of incapacitated offenders ≤ 0.5    -10.86 (3.07)***  -9.54 (2.94)***  -1.31 (0.74)* 
0.5 < Number of incapacitated offenders ≤ 1.0     -8.64 (3.25)**  -8.05 (3.24)**  -0.60 (0.48) 
1.0 < Number of incapacitated offenders ≤ 1.5     -5.32 (1.70)***  -4.72 (1.65)***  -0.60 (0.50) 
Number of incapacitated offenders > 1.5     -4.28 (1.49)***  -3.59 (1.44)**  -0.69 (0.30)** 
         
Number of observations  1,296  1,296  1,296  1,296 
 
Notes. All variables are per 10,000 population. Standard errors between parentheses. Other covariates 
include rate of unemployment, number of arrests per population, area-fixed effects, year-fixed effects and 
quarter-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by urban area. * Statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level; ** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level; *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
   41 
 
Table 3  Estimated effect of habitual offender law on the number of active prolific offenders known to 
the police, 12 urban areas, 1996-2007 
Dependent variable:  Prolific offenders aged 25 or 
over known to the police 
Prolific offenders aged 25 or 
over known to the police 
     
Number of incapacitated offenders   -0.92 (0.18)***  -0.58 (0.24)** 
Number of incapacitated offenders (t-1)    -0.49 (0.23)** 
     
Number of areas  12  12 
Number of years  12  12 
     
Number of observations  144  144 
 
Notes. Standard errors between parentheses. Other covariates include area-fixed effects, year-fixed effects 
and  area-specific  linear  time  trends.  *  Statistically  significant  at  the  10  percent  level;  **  Statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level; *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
   42 
 
Table 4  Estimated  incapacitation  effect  of  habitual  offender  law  on  rate  of  recorded  theft  per 
month, sensitivity analysis 
Dependent variable: theft from car and 
burglary 
Baseline model  Incl. area-specific 
linear trends 




           
Incapacitated offenders ≤ 0.5  -10.86 (3.07)***  -9.28 (3.23)***       
0.5 < Incapacitated offenders ≤ 1.0   -8.64 (3.25)**  -7.00 (2.89)**       
1.0 < Incapacitated offenders ≤ 1.5   -5.32 (1.70)***  -5.77 (2.37)**       
Incapacitated offenders > 1.5   -4.28 (1.49)***  -4.98 (2.34)*       
           
Incapacitated offenders ≤ 0.5      -11.21 (3.14)***     
0.5 < Incapacitated offenders ≤ 0.75      -9.66 (3.10)***     
0.75 < Incapacitated offenders ≤ 1.0      -7.82 (3.51)**     
1.0 < Incapacitated offenders ≤ 1.25      -5.37 (2.18)**     
1.25 < Incapacitated offenders ≤ 1.5      -5.49 (1.46)***     
1.5 < Incapacitated offenders ≤ 1.75      -5.47 (1.77)***     
Incapacitated offenders > 1.75      -3.53 (1.28)**     
           
Incap. offenders ≤ 0.5 (before)        -11.05 (3.66)***   
Incap. offenders ≤ 0.5 (after)        -11.41 (2.98)***   
0.5 < Incap. offenders ≤ 1.0 (before)        -7.71 (3.74)*   
0.5 < Incap. offenders ≤ 1.0 (after)        -9.39 (3.38)**   
1.0 < Incap. offenders ≤ 1.5 (before)        -   
1.0 < Incap. offenders ≤ 1.5 (after)        -5.66 (2.07)**   
Incap. offenders > 1.5 (before)        -   
Incap. offenders > 1.5 (after)        -4.52 (1.73)**   
           
Incapacitated offenders ≤ 0.5 (+)          -10.42 (3.02)*** 
Incapacitated offenders ≤ 0.5 (–)          -13.79 (3.12)*** 
0.5 < Incapacitated offenders ≤ 1.0 (+)          -8.72 (3.44)** 
0.5 < Incapacitated offenders ≤ 1.0 (–)          -8.48 (2.62)*** 
1.0 < Incapacitated offenders ≤ 1.5 (+)          -5.39 (1.74)*** 
1.0 < Incapacitated offenders ≤ 1.5 (–)          -5.16 (1.64)** 
Incapacitated offenders > 1.5 (+)          -3.80 (1.43)** 
Incapacitated offenders > 1.5 (–)          -5.07 (1.52)*** 
 
Notes.  Number  of  observations  equal  to  1,296  for  each  specification.  All  variables  are  per  10,000 
population. Other covariates include rate of unemployment, number of arrests per population, area-fixed 
effects, year-fixed effects and quarter-fixed effects. Standard errors between parentheses. Standard errors 
clustered by urban area. * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** Statistically significant at the 
5 percent level; *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Figure 1   Number of prolific offenders sentenced under the habitual offender law, 2001-2007 
1   
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Figure 2   Moment of introduction of the habitual offender law, 12 urban areas 
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Figure 3  Police  recorded  theft  from  car  and  domestic  burglary  per  10,000  population,  urban  areas 
grouped by moment of introduction, January 1998 until moment of introduction of law 
 
Note.  A  dotted  line  denotes  the  average  crime  rate  over  the  period  January  1998  until  the  moment  of 
introduction. 
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Figure 4    Number  of  offenders  sentenced  under  the  habitual  offender  law  since  introduction  until 
October 2004 (‘first wave’), urban areas in initial group and The Hague-region 
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Figure 5  Number of offenders sentenced under the habitual offender law since November 2004 or 
since introduction if introduced after November 2004 (‘second wave’), 12 urban areas 
 
 
Note. The number of offenders sentenced under the new law is set to zero at November 2004 for the eight 
urban areas that introduced the policy before this date. 
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Figure 6  Crime rate three years before and after introduction of habitual offender law, 12 urban areas 
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Figure 7  Monthly rate of recorded theft with and without the estimated effect of incapacitation, 12 
urban areas, January 1999 – December 2007 
    
 
Note. The trend without the incapacitation effect is the sum of the actual number of thefts plus the number 
of thefts prevented for each individual urban area, based on the parameter estimates in the second column 
of Table 2. Shown is the five-months averaged trend. 














































Actual trend Simulated trend without incapacitation effect50 
 
Figure 8  Number  of  offenses  on  criminal  record  of  offenders  sentenced  under  the  2001  law  at 
different rates of application of the law, annual averages, 12 urban areas, 2001-2007 
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Figure 9  Estimated annual costs and benefits for an urban area of incapacitating one additional prolific 
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